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DISCOVERY OF CHURCH
RECORDS
CARL A. ECK*
INTRODUCTION
This article will address the protection of Canon 489 and 490 archi-
val documents' from discovery and production in civil litigations. I have
been involved in the protection of archival documents in trial litigation
situations in the past, one of which has resulted in an appeal.2 I would
like to address that litigation because as of today, with the exception of
Pennsylvania, I know of no federal or state appellate decision that has
addressed the specific question of the propriety of discovering archival
documents. There are, however, several isolated and unpublished trial
court opinions which do concern this issue-one in the state of Montana
3
and one in the state of Minnesota.4
I. HUTCHINSON v. LUDDY
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania is typically the final court of
appellate review in Pennsylvania. In isolated situations, however, a case
may be brought to the supreme court. Otherwise one must obtain a writ
of appeal or writ of allocator. We argued Hutchinson v. Luddy5 before
the superior court and are now attempting to obtain a writ of allocator
before the supreme court. Accordingly, I hope that my experience and
involvement in these trials and appeals will elucidate our strategy and
assist you and your diocese in resisting or responding to requests for pro-
duction of documents that are contained in the archives.
* The author is a partner in the Pittsburgh law firm of Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek
& Eck. He received his undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Notre Dame.
1 1983 Code c. 489; 1983 Code c. 490.
2 Hutchinson v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
3 KB. v. Roman Catholic Bishop and Diocese of Great Falls, Adv. No. 88-1174 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. 9th Dist. filed Feb. 2, 1990).
4 State v. Carriere, (Minn. Dist. Ct. 9th Dist. filed Dec. 11, 1991).
5 606 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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A. Nature of the Hutchinson Action
The Hutchinson action was filed in October of 1988 in Somerset
County, Pennsylvania, in a trial court of unlimited jurisdiction. The
original complaint alleged pedophilic activities on the part of a diocesan
priest with a male minor.' Shortly after the original complaint was filed,
an amended complaint was served against the Diocese, naming the
bishop and four different monsignors who had held various positions in
the Diocese for a period of about ten years.' The allegations against the
Diocese, the bishop and monsignors were not the typical ones of negli-
gent hiring, negligent retention or agency. Rather a new, unique and
very difficult claim to defend against was asserted. The plaintiff alleged
that in the course of operating the Diocese, the Diocese had permitted or
adopted a policy of condoning sexual activity by failing to actively inves-
tigate complaints of sexual activity and by allegedly encouraging the
priest within the Diocese to engage in sexual activities.' The plaintiff
essentially argued that although the Diocese did not approve of such ac-
tivity, it did not necessarily disapprove of it either. Moreover, the plain-
tiff asserted that the Diocese's failure to investigate the allegations was
the equivalent of looking the other way and encouraging priests to in-
volve themselves in that kind of activity.
The court dismissed the claim of respondeat superior on our prelimi-
nary objections and we were left defending the Diocese on the main count
of condoning or establishing a pattern that encouraged sexual activity.
B. Plaintiffs Discovery Requests
In order to substantiate its claim, the plaintiff engaged in a series of
discovery procedures aimed primarily at developing information concern-
ing the named defendant priest and all other priests in the Diocese.
1. Plaintiffs Service of Interrogatories
The first pleading we received from the plaintiff was a series of in-
terrogatories designed to illicit the identity of priests about whom the
bishop had received complaints within the past ten to fifteen years.9 The
interrogatories were posed in such a way that we attempted to limit the
responses. As an aside, if you find yourself in this type of litigation, you
will find that the plaintiff most likely has a lot more knowledge about the
priests in the Diocese than you do until you finally talk to the bishop and
start working closely with your client. In the interrogatories, the plain-
tiff specifically named priests who the plaintiff knew had been ques-
6 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 906.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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tioned by the bishop regarding some sexual activity complaints. The in-
terrogatories were designed to develop what activity or inactivity the
Diocese had engaged in upon receiving complaints regarding a priest.
The plaintiff sought to discover the following six items: (1) what ac-
tions had the Diocese taken; (2) what investigation had the Diocese un-
dertaken after receiving the complaint; (3) what reporting or lack of re-
porting to state or public officials had the Diocese done; (4) whether the
Diocese had reassigned the priest or those priests who had moved from
one parish or diocese to another; (5) whether the priest or priests under-
went psychological evaluation; and (6) whether or not the priests were
removed from the parish and how long it took the bishop to remove the
priest.
After raising numerous objections to the plaintiffs interrogatories,
we were nevertheless forced to respond to many of the interrogatories.
However, we attempted to and were partially successful in limiting the
time period for which we were accountable. 10
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Production of Documents
The plaintiff next filed a motion for production of documents. We
produced the personnel file of the named defendant priest yet refused to
disclose any information concerning the other priests who were not
named as defendants. In addition, we refused to provide any further in-
formation on the named defendant or other priests on the ground that
documentation or information was contained in the archives set up by
Canons 489 and 490.11 As expected, the plaintiff did not accept our ob-
jections and filed a motion to compel production of the documents. 12 We
opposed the plaintiffs motion to compel on the following grounds: (1) ac-
cording to the priest-penitent privilege, the documentation could not be
discovered,' 3 and (2) the bishop, pursuant to Canon Law, was not per-
mitted to remove documentation for the purpose of inspection or copy-
ing.' 4 We further argued that ordering the bishop to produce such docu-
ments would require him to violate the Canon Law and his religious
10 Id. at 907.
11 Id. at 906.
12 Id. at 907.
13 PA. R. Civ. P. 4011.255. Section 4011.255 provides for the priest-penitent privilege
stating
[n]o clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel of any regularly estab-
lished church or religious organization ... who while in the course of his duties
has acquired information from any person secretly and in confidence shall be
compelled, or allowed without consent of such person, to disclose that informa-
tion in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any grand jury, trav-
erse or petit jury ....
Id.
14 1983 Code c. 490, sec. 3
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obligations which would, in effect, be violative of his First Amendment
rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 15
We also argued that a Pennsylvania statute barred production of
these documents. That statute prohibits the discovery or production of
information which is conveyed to a clergyman if it is conveyed in confi-
dence and in the course of performing a function as a clergyman or min-
ister.16 In addition, to support our position, we created and filed two
separate sets of affidavits signed by our bishops. This particular case
involved a bishop who retired immediately after the suit was filed and
his successor. We filed extensive affidavits, indicating the reason for the
Canon Laws' existence and the bishop's own interpretation of his obliga-
tions under the Canon Law. We detailed how the bishop came to possess
the documents placed in the archive but did not describe the documents.
To do so would have, in effect, given the plaintiff what he was attempting
to obtain and which we felt he was not entitled to obtain.
a. Procedural History in the Trial Court
Somerset County, is located in a rural section of Western Penn-
sylvania and has two high calibre judges. One particular judge who han-
dled this case put a tremendous amount of consideration and study into
the issue. He permitted argument and extensive briefing by both sides.
Initially, he decided the issue against us but later permitted us to file a
petition for reargument and reconsideration which he granted. We once
again argued the issue but again the judge decided the issue against us.
Thereafter, the judge ordered us to produce the documents within twenty
days. 7 After he entered this order, we filed a motion for appeal.
The plaintiff countered our motion by asserting that the trial court's
decision on the discovery matter was interlocutory in nature and, there-
fore, was not appealable. However, we were successful in convincing the
judge that the matter was appealable since the issue was of such great
importance, even though it was not the dispositive issue of the case.1 8 If
the court had not permitted us to appeal and had ordered us to produce
the documents, the harm would have already been done even if we were
able to sustain our position on appeal. In addition, the judge agreed that
we could have the appeal act as a supersedeas, thereby not requiring us
to comply with the twenty-day production order.' 9 As of this date, we
15 PA. CONST. art. I, sec. 3 provides that "[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; ... no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience .... "
16 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (1993).
17 Hutchinson v. Luddy, No. 445 (Pa. C.P. Somerset County, Civ. Div. 1988).
18 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 907.
19 Id.
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have not produced any documents and we are continuing to try not to
produce them, even through the course of the appeal.
b. Procedural History in the Appellate Court
Thereafter, on August 21, 1991, we argued the appeal issues before
the superior court. After a considerable amount of time, the superior
court rendered an opinion upholding the trial court's opinion and di-
recting that the documents be produced.2"
We then filed a petition for free argument before the superior court.
After sixty days, the superior court denied the petition for free argument
and ordered the documents to be produced.2 1 We are currently in the
process of filing a writ of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
As you can see, we are dealing in a very timely fashion with a very
timely issue. We have the opportunity to participate in or at least wit-
ness the making of some law which may eventually become good law.
II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAw
Let us review some of the applicable principles of law in light of
these facts. First, disclosure through discovery of documents kept in the
secret archives presents a new and very sharp conflict between the Cath-
olic Church and civil litigants. Canon 489 directs, orders, and compels
each diocese to establish a secret archives file.2 2 Remember, the word
"secret" should not be used in relation to this subject because it has a
negative connotation even though the Canon Law refers to it as a "secret
archive."2 3 The Canon Law states that in this completely locked and
secure area, documents will be kept under secrecy and will be carefully
guarded.2 4 The Canon also refers to the storage of documents dealing
with criminal matters-"criminal" under the Canon Law, not under the
secular law.25 Canon 489 says it is to be placed in a most secure place.2 6
20 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 905.
21 Id.
22 1983 Code c. 489, sec. 1. Canon 489 sec. 1 states
[In the diocesan curia there is also to be a secret archive, or at least in the
ordinary archive there is to be a safe or cabinet, which is securely closed and
bolted and which cannot be removed. In this archive documents which are to
be kept under secrecy are to be most carefully guarded.
CODE OF CANON LAW, LATIN ENGLISH EDITION c. 489 sec. 1, at 185 [hereinafter CODE].
23 CODE cc. 489, 490, at 185.
24 CODE c. 489 sec. 1., at 185.
25 CODE c. 489 sec. 2, at 185. Canon 489 sec. 2 states that [e]ach year documents of crimi-
nal cases concerning moral matters are to be destroyed whenever the guilty parties have
died, or ten years have elapsed since a condemnatory sentence concluded the affair. A
short summary of the facts is to be kept, together with the text of the definitive judgement."
Id.
26 CODE c. 489 sec. 1, at 185.
35 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 3
Canon 490 indicates that only the bishop of the diocese can have the
key2 7 and that documents are "not to be removed."28
A. Conflict Between Church Law and Civil Law--Generally
The conflict obviously arises because on one hand the Catholic
Church has the right to practice its constitutional freedom of religion by
establishing and following rules for the appropriate practice of its faith
and to allow its members to act in accordance with that faith. Yet, on the
other hand, a civil litigant has the right to discover the documentation
which he or she believes may be of assistance in prosecuting a claim for
damages. The Canon Law directs each dioceses to set up files 2 9 and
there are rules and regulations which the bishop must comply with in
regard to such files.3 0 These particular Canons, as all other Canons, reg-
ulate the internal functioning of the Catholic Church. The basis for the
dispute or the conflict is that the Church claims that these documents
are protected by the very words of the Canon from disclosure and inspec-
tion.3 Therefore, the Church claims that these documents are privi-
leged and not discoverable. Furthermore, the Church maintains that the
diocese or the bishop cannot, of his own, elect to remove the documents
because he is directed by Canon Law not to remove the documents.3 2
Therefore, even if the bishop would like to make the documents avail-
able, he is not allowed to because the right exists not only in the bishop
but the diocese to have the documents protected. However, the litigants
will claim that these documents are relevant, material to the case, and
are similar to any other document or subject being discovered.
Tedious research was required to find any decisive or substantive
law that would be precisely on point or at least assist us in analyzing our
position to the rights of a civil litigant versus the rights of the Church.
When dealing with pre-trial discovery efforts, we did find that both state
and federal courts are much more likely to listen to an argument that
would in some way limit pre-trial discovery as opposed to trial evidence
during the course of an actual trial. Starting with that in mind, we felt
that we had at least some basis upon which to attempt to limit and pre-
vent discovery. The litigants in this case, the Church and the private
civil litigant, had to follow the same rules and had to work from the same
set of case citations. We had to follow the same procedural citations that
we had in any other type of litigation. We based our argument for re-
27 CODE c. 490 sec. 1, at 185.
28 CODE C. 490 sec. 3, at 185. Canon 490 sec. 3 states: "Documents are not to be removed
from the secret archive or safe." Id.
29 CODE c. 486, at 183.
30 CODE cc. 486-490, at 183-85.
31 CODE C. 489 sec. 1, at 185.
32 CODE C. 490 sec. 3, at 185.
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stricting discovery on Canon Law, arguing that the holder of the docu-
ments (the bishop or the diocese) had no discretion or right to disclose
the documents. We argued that this right existed under the Church law
and to the diocese and then to the bishop upon whom the notice to pro-
duce was served. If these documents were not protected and the bishop
was ordered to produce them, Church law would be violated. We also
argued that to compel the bishop to produce the documents would re-
quire him to act contrary to the Canon Law and would require him to
violate his own faith which is a substantial interference with his right of
freedom of religion.
B. Theory of Hierarchal Structure and Dominations
The first prong of our argument was based on the jurisprudence of
hierarchal structure and dominations. Said another way, whenever they
can and whenever possible, the courts will attempt to avoid making or
approaching a decision that has constitutional implications. 3 3 Courts,
particularly those in Pennsylvania, have held in the past that the Catho-
lic Church, as an organization, is an entity subject to the jurisdiction of
the Pope, and all Catholic dioceses are subject to that jurisdiction. As
such, the Catholic Church and every diocese has to be subservient to the
rules of the Roman Catholic Church.3 4 Many of our state courts have
upheld Canon Law in other situations, for example, as it related to di-
vorce, 35 remarriage, premarital sex, 37 homosexuality,3" and Days of
Holy Obligation.3 9 With that in mind, it was felt that the court might
recognize that a legal entity such as a church or a religion, of necessity,
needs internal rules in order to exist, govern itself, and to maintain its
hierarchal structure.
An effort was made to convince the court that most courts should, in
the exercise of judicial wisdom, attempt to avoid involvement in ecclesi-
33 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919) ("Considerations of propriety,
as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the consti-
tutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our
judicial function.. . ."); Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 436 A.2d 186, 187 (Pa. 1981) ("It is
well settled that when a case raises both constitutional and non-constitutional issues, a
court should not reach the constitutional issue if the case can properly be decided on non-
constitutional grounds.").
34 See, e.g., Bohachevsky v. Sembrot, 81 A.2d 554, 556-57 (1951).
35 See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992).
38 See, e.g., Dignity Twin Cities v. The Newman Ctr. and Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
39 See, e.g., Barran v. Nayyar, 572 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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astical affairs and not be required to interpret church law.40 We argued
that the Court should treat involvement in the Church as it treats in-
volvement in a corporation. For instance, courts are generally reluctant
to interfere with the internal structure of a corporation unless the corpo-
ration has done something absolutely contrary to public policy or has
subordinated the rights of stockholders. 4 ' We also argued that the
courts should afford churches and religions even more traditional protec-
tion from court interference, particularly where the law of that particu-
lar church has not been disturbed and has been in existence for a consid-
erable period of time, as our Canon Law has been. We found that courts
generally are willing to afford a higher realm of protection from interfer-
ence in church affairs than business affairs.
C. Assertion of a Privilege
The second prong of our argument was that for the court to take a
position with respect to the internal operation of the church, there had to
be a substantial compelling reason that could not be served in any way
other than the court granting an inferior constitutional position to the
church position. This raised the issue of privilege. In most state and
federal courts, not all matters are discoverable. The doctrine of privilege
allows a litigant to file a motion for a protective order if he or she be-
lieves that the matter at issue in discovery is truly a privileged matter.4 2
Pennsylvania probably has the most broad or liberal right of discovery of
any state.43 Documents prepared in anticipation of a trial are discovera-
ble and any document that is claimed relevant is discoverable. 44 How-
ever, Pennsylvania law, despite its liberal nature, does allow for claim of
privilege. 45 Therefore, when the plaintiff served a notice of production in
Hutchinson we claimed that the documents were privileged in addition
to being protected under Canon Law.
46
40 InAtterbury v. Smith, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that where "the
resolution of the issue involves questions of discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law, a civil court must defer to the highest church judicatory to which the question has
been carried." Atterbury v. Smith, 522 A.2d 683, 685-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (citing
Presbytery of Beaver-butler of the United Presbyterian Church v. Middlesex Presbyterian
Church, 489 A.2d 1317, 1319 (Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 887 (1985) (citing Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871))).
41 See Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. de-
nied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
42 See FED. R. EVID. 501.
43 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (1993).
44 PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4025.
45 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943; PA. R. Cirv. P. 4011.255.
46 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 908-910.
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Pennsylvania has a statute known as the "Clergyman Statute,"4 7
which is separate and distinct from the priest-penitent privilege. This
statute mirrors Canons 489 and 490. It states that a clergyman, includ-
ing ministers of any recognized religion, cannot be compelled to disclose
secret or confidential information which were received in the course of
his duties. 48 If you compare the Pennsylvania statute with Canons 489
and 490, you will see a great deal of similarity. Both pertain to docu-
ments received by clergy in the course of the performance of that clergy-
man's duty, either as bishop or minister. Moreover, both indicate that if
the material is received during the course of those duties and is given in
confidence, the documents are not discoverable. 49 Canon 489 says you
cannot take them out of the archive.5 0 The Pennsylvania statute says
that they are not discoverable.5 " This was a major point in our favor
after having the other arguments on the business of the courts not inter-
fering with constitutional rights and the courts not interfering with the
internal operation of the church. We argued that by enacting this partic-
ular statute Pennsylvania had recognized a greater interest in preclud-
ing discovery than allowing it.
Several Pennsylvania cases have interpreted the statute-some fa-
vorably, some unfavorably.5 2 We argued to the court that if one looked
at the affidavits that were filed, we complied with the Canon Law re-
quirements, but just as importantly, we complied with the Clergyman
Statute.53 The affidavits of the two bishops indicated that they were
bishops (clergymen), they had received the documents in confidence and
then placed them in the secret archives file in the course of their duties,
and they could not remove them without violating their own religious
tenets. In addition, we argued that the priest penitent-privilege would
also apply since the bishops may have received the information by virtue
of a confessional; not a closed confessional as we all know it, but a confes-
sional in which the accused priest was summoned and asked to confess
what he had done.5 4
47 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943.
48 Id.
49 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943.
50 CODE c. 489 sec. 3, at 185.
51 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5943.
52 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pa. v. Paterson, 572 A.2d 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (statute
did not apply, statements not made in confidence); Fahifelder v. Commonwealth, Pa. Bd. of
Probation, 470 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
53 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 906-907.
54 See Fahifelder, 470 A.2d at 1131-32 (court disallowed privilege because no confidential
relationship).
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D. First Amendment-The Free Exercise Argument
We also spent a great deal of time on the constitutional approach
because, as we all know, the First Amendment grants all of us the right
to practice our religion freely.55 The party which claims certain docu-
ments are not discoverable due to a free exercise of religion argument
does not have the burden of proof.5" The other party must demonstrate
that he needs the documents or that there is a substantial state interest
that is entitled to greater accord and respect by the court than the claim
of the right of practicing one's religion without interference.5 7 In fact,
some of the cases we examined regard only those interests of the highest
order which are not otherwise served to outweigh a legitimate claim for
free exercise of religion.58 We stressed that argument and maintained
that to require the bishop to produce documents from the secret archive
was, in effect, state action interfering with the practice of the faith.59 We
also maintained that, a civil litigant does not have an interest in pretrial
discovery that would equate to a significant magnitude of state inter-
est.6 0 All things being equal, the court should not allow pretrial discov-
ery of the secret archives because the plaintiff had not met the burden of
a compelling state interest.
E. Availability of the Information Elsewhere
More importantly, the information that the plaintiff wanted from
the secret archives could be secured in less obstructive constitutionally
charged ways. For example, the plaintiff could depose the bishop, the
priest, and the victim. There are still other ways by which the plaintiff
could get the same information without violating the secret archives.
The plaintiff argued that a civil litigant's rights to discovery in Penn-
sylvania extends to anything that may be relevant, and the applicable
test is not whether it is admissible at trial but whether the material
sought could lead to relevant information.6 Based on the current status
of the discovery procedures in Pennsylvania, the court ruled that where
the Canon Law conflicts with the right of discovery as it did here, the
right of discovery must prevail. 2 The court did not distinguish, as we
argued, between pretrial discovery and trial evidence. The court failed
55 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56 See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1979).
57 See In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
58 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
59 See Atterbury v. Smith, 522 A.2d 683 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); see also Canovaro v.
Brothers of the Order of Hermits, Etc., 191 A. 140, 144 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1937).
60 See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984); In Re Estate of Laning, 339
A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
61 Hutchinson, 606 A.2d at 912.
62 Id.
DISCOVERY OF CHURCH RECORDS
to distinguish between the rights of a civil litigant versus the rights of
the bishop based upon the content of the bishop's affidavit to maintain
the documents which he had received in confidence either under the Ca-
non Law or the Pennsylvania Clergyman Statute.
III. POTENTIAL FUTURE ANALOGY
If this issue is reargued there are several, favorable points to be
raised. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in Common-
wealth v. Wilson6 3 that any information a rape victim gives to a rape
counselor will be considered nondiscoverable. 4 The Court extended the
statutory sexual assault counselor privilege to protect a counselor's
records, although the statute on its face appeared only to protect com-
pelled testimony from a counselor. 5 The Court stated that the privilege
would be meaningless if the protected information were protected only in
testimonial form. 66 Additionally the Court ruled that a statutory privi-
lege is an indication that the legislature acknowledges the significance of
a particular interest and has chosen to protect that interest.
6 7
The situation regarding rape counselors can be analogized to the
Clergyman Statute which is also a legislatively enacted privilege in-
tended to ensure that what is told to a clergyman in confidence should
not be discoverable. 6 8 By enacting the statute, the legislature has deter-
mined that this is a greater right to protect than the right of a civil liti-
gant to get that information. In Wilson, the party attempting to discover
the information was a criminal defendant-the defendant charged with
rape.6 9 Generally, a defendant's right in a criminal case is accorded
more protection than the civil litigant's right to discovery. Therefore it
would seem that a court would also prevent discovery of priest-penitent
documents. This is encouraging; hopefully, the supreme court will give
us another day in court to argue that position.
IV. RISKS INVOLVED
One of the reasons we have gone to such length in protecting and
refusing to produce the archival documents is that if we lose that argu-
ment there are some tremendous problems that will face bishops. A
bishop, for reasons of his own conviction, may elect not to produce the
documents. What are the risks attendant in losing the argument and
63 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992).
64 Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Pa. 1992).
65 Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1295; see 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5945.1 (1993).
66 Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1295.
67 Id.
68 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (1993).
69 Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1292.
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having your client, the bishop, saying that he is constrained and cannot
reveal the documents?
Obviously, there are several risks. From a trial standpoint, one risk
is that the court can make judicial admissions of disputed facts. There
are available sanctions that can be applied to the noncomplying party
who has lost a discovery conflict.70 In addition to having the court admit
disputed facts, as a matter of court order, the court can strike pleadings.
It can, in effect, preclude the presentation of evidences in defenses. 71
The court may also enter a default judgment and decide the case of liabil-
ity against you and your client.7 2 And last, but not least, the court could
hold your bishop in civil contempt.7 3
CONCLUSION
I have some general comments that I would like to make and some
suggestions that might help you. First of all, when one claims privilege,
the burden is on that party to prove the privilege. When the plaintiff
attempts to overcome the defendant's constitutional right, the burden is
on the plaintiff to show a compelling state interest. When you claim
privilege, one cannot simply claim, "Well, protection under Canons 489
and 490 or the clergyman privilege and throw them in front of the court.
It is incumbent upon the party asserting the privilege to demonstrate
why they are entitled to that privilege. It also must be shown that there
is no compelling reason for the plaintiff to have the documentation and
that the information can be obtained by less obstructive means. If the
forum state has a Clergyman Statute, or something parallel to that, one
can argue from a state interest as well as Canon Law. Affidavits must be
prepared and filed with the court. The affidavits should be as specific as
possible without revealing what is in the archives. It is a "damned if you
do and damned if you don't" situation in many cases. However, the effort
must be made to convince the trial court that the words "secret archive"
are not synonymous with incriminating evidence. Other means of pre-
trial discovery could be suggested. The court must be convinced that the
proverbial "smoking gun" is not in the secret archives. That takes a lot of
tightrope walking from a pleading standpoint but it can be done with
appropriate time and effort.
In addition, it is important that when one gets into a discovery bat-
tle on the secret archives documents, he somehow gets permission from
the court to establish evidentiary hearings to determine what evidence
the plaintiff needs to present his case and what other means exists for
70 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 37; PA. R. Civ. P. 4019.
71 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d); PA. R. Civ. P. 4019.31.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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him to get the information. The court must be convinced that you are not
trying to defeat discovery. You are trying to protect the secret archives
establishment as a canon of the Church. As a right, the Church had to
establish internal rules and regulations and these Canons were set up
long before anybody thought of pedophilic lawsuit or sexual molestation
cases. If you do not succeed, the plaintiff will try his case in discovery.
Also the bishop and diocese may be very reluctant to try the case on its
merits. It really requires a great deal of advocacy to present and protect
the documents and it is getting tougher and tougher, but there is no al-
ternative. The alternative is to give up the documents or not to give
them up and be saddled with a default judgment.
RELEVANT COMMENTS
Ward Shanahan, Helena, Mt.: I came here pursuant to Carl's re-
quest that "misery loves company." I wanted to inform you that there
has been a ruling in Montana by the Supreme Court in a case known as
the "Burns"74 case. I will not give you any further citation on that. This
was a criminal case involving sexual assault. In Montana, we have, after
an enlightened constitution of 1972, a two-tier right of privacy. That
right of privacy is divided into Article II, Section 9, which, of course, was
urged by the press. It says that when you have some private information
in the state record, the person who is claiming the right of privacy must
show that the right of privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclo-
sure. We have Article II, Section 10, which says that, in the ordinary
right of privacy, if the state is trying to invade privacy, it must show a
compelling state interest. To this point, we do not know exactly how
those two fit together. In the Burns case, the district court denied dis-
covery of the personnel file of a priest involved and that went to the
supreme court. The supreme court sustained, in a 6 - 1 decision, the
district court's exercise of discretion in that discovery ruling.75 The only
female member of the court wrote a dissent in which she said some very
unflattering things about the Catholic Church.76 My partner was there
with the Chancellor at the time the judge made the ruling but the Catho-
lic Church made no request that the personnel file remain private. This
is a criminal case and it was up to the defendant to assert the right of
privacy. As far as the dissent is concerned, we are not guilty. But the
judge took us to task because the judge assumed from statements in the
record that we had requested that the file remain private, which we did
74 State of Montana v. Burns, 830 P.2d 1318 (Mont. 1992).
75 Id. at 1318.
76 Id. at 1322-26 ("The Catholic Church has been placed both above and outside the reach
of the law with regard to the investigation and prosecution of the very animal offenses
which people of value and morality find so disturbing.").
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not. Following that, an editorial in the "Montana Standard" in Butte,
Montana, reiterated the statements of the dissenting judge at some
length, making a public attack upon the bishop and the Church and fac-
ing us with the problem of what we should do about that.
Secondly, we have another case pending. Three days ago, we had a
discovery issued against us which said that we had to disclose the per-
sonnel file. We reargued on the Burns case decision. The court three
days ago, reaffirmed that decision. We are now faced with a decision-
should we disclose the file or should we apply for supervisory control. It
is a personnel file. There has been no secret archives claimed. I do not
think that I am in the position, and I guess you would agree with me.
Eck: We produced without question the personnel file of the named
priest. We do not produce the personnel file of any other priest, as a
matter of course. You have the case, KB v. Roman Catholic Church, that
in a civil case said the file was not discoverable. That was a trial court
opinion. Now, you have a state court opinion in a criminal case. I think
in a criminal case, you have a little better argument because in a crimi-
nal case you cannot compel the defendant to incriminate himself. I think
you can argue that is another privilege in addition to the others that you
do not have a civil litigant case.
